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I.

INTRODUCTION

The “best notice that is practicable under the circumstances”
standard in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)(B) is often a
source of disagreement between parties, or between a party and the
1
court, in class action litigation. Over time, some agreement, or at
least some standard practices, regarding communication methods
have evolved: mail and print publication are the traditional means
2
of effecting notice. However, as this Comment will argue, in a
society where many, even most, people use the internet and other
3
newer communication technologies, those traditional practices do
4
not necessarily meet the standard as articulated in the rule. Courts
often seem to rely principally on precedent when determining what
5
constitutes adequate notice instead of focusing on the language of
the rule, which, by specifically pointing to “the circumstances,”
suggests that the standard of “best notice practicable” is different in
6
each case. While compliance with Rule 23(c)(2)(B) may seem like
a minor procedural issue, compliance is in fact critical: a class
member’s constitutional rights can be violated if notice is
7
ineffective or inappropriate in the circumstances. For this reason,
courts must adhere more thoughtfully and faithfully to Rule
23(c)(2)(B)’s “best notice that is practicable under the
circumstances” standard.

1. See, e.g., Bauer v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 277 F.R.D. 558, 564 (W.D. Wis.
2012) (certifying the class and setting a deadline for the parties to settle
disagreements about the proposed notice); Jermyn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., No. 08
Civ. 00214(CM), 2010 WL 5187746, at *4–9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2010) (describing
and entering order regarding defendant’s objections to plaintiff’s proposed notice
plan).
2. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 8:30, Westlaw (database updated Sept.
2015); see infra Section III.A.
3. See infra Section III.B.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Section IV.A.
7. See infra Section II.C.
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The issue of courts’ comfort with the communication
technologies of today’s world was highlighted in a series of court
orders trying to resolve disputes over notice in Mark v. Gawker
8
Media LLC. This case generated much interest in the legal world
for allowing the use of social media sites or accounts for notice in a
9
10
collective action, which is not the same as a class action. However,
the arguments of the parties and the orders of the court illustrate
the competing views on the proper role of new communication
technologies in class action notice. While the Gawker court
ultimately denied class certification and granted summary
11
judgment to the defendants, the allowance of notice via social
media may be influential in future class actions.

8. Mark v. Gawker Media LLC, No. 13 Civ. 04347, 2015 WL 2330274, at
*1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2015) (approving notice through social media with the
limitations that plaintiffs must “unfollow” potential plaintiffs who do not respond
on Twitter by a deadline and must not “friend” potential plaintiffs on Facebook);
Mark v. Gawker Media LLC, No. 13 Civ. 04347, 2015 WL 2330079, at *1–2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2015) (rejecting plaintiff’s notice plan because of overbreadth
and an appearance of attempting to punish Gawker rather than to provide notice,
including rejecting postings on certain Reddit and Tumblr pages and general
tweets or public postings on Twitter, Facebook, and LinkedIn); Mark v. Gawker
Media LLC, No. 13 Civ. 04347, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2015) (denying any request
by plaintiffs to provide notice through media additional to those already
approved, such as through Xbox live); Mark v. Gawker Media LLC, No. 13 Civ.
04347, 2014 WL 5557489, at *3–7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2014) (granting conditional
certification and court-authorized notice, including finding that posting notice on
Gawker’s website and blogs would be overbroad, but allowing use of social media
because “the vast majority [of potential collective members] likely have at least one
such account,” and directing the parties to submit a plan for proposed social
media postings and any disputes about them).
9. See Y. Peter Kang, Gawker Interns Can Notify Class of Lawsuit Via Social
Media, LAW360 (Apr. 13, 2015, 3:53 PM), http://www.law360.com
/articles/642415/gawker-interns-can-notify-class-of-lawsuit-via-social-media; Shari
Claire Lewis, Tech Tools Are Increasingly Used to Disseminate Notice; Internet Issues/Social
Media, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 17, 2015, LEXIS.
10. See SAM J. SMITH & CHRISTINE M. JALBERT, CERTIFICATION—216(B)
COLLECTIVE ACTIONS V. RULE 23 CLASS ACTIONS & ENTERPRISE COVERAGE UNDER THE
FLSA
1–23
(2011),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/administrative/labor_law/meetings/2011/ac2011/084.authcheckdam.pdf
(describing the certification process for each type of action and noting differences
between them).
11. Mark v. Gawker Media LLC, No. 13 Civ. 04347, 2016 WL 1271064
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2016).
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12

This Comment will first introduce class action notice, then
13
summarize the history of class actions in general and of class
14
action notice under Rule 23(c)(2)(B) in order to highlight the
issues of justice and constitutional rights implicated by class action
notice. This Comment will then review courts’ sanction and use of
what is here categorized as “traditional,” or pre-internet, means of
notice under Rule 23—namely, physical mail, print newspaper
15
publication, television, and radio. Then, courts’ use of more
current means of notice will be reviewed, from the older and more
16
common technologies of email and websites to the newer and less
17
18
common means of social media and text messaging. This
Comment will then discuss the implications of notice practices in
today’s world in terms of compliance with Rule 23(c)(2)(B)’s “best
notice that is practicable under the circumstances” standard,
concluding that the language and history of Rule 23(c)(2)(B), in
connection with constitutional due process imperatives, require
courts to use newer communication technology methods in most
cases and to explicitly base all notice scheme decisions on the
19
standard given in Rule 23(c)(2)(B)’s language. Additionally,
courts must be more active in evaluating notice plans and
20
protecting the constitutional rights of class members.
II. HISTORY OF CLASS ACTION NOTICE UNDER RULE 23(C)(2)(B)
A.

Introduction to Class Action Notice and Its Constitutional
Implications

Before reviewing the history of class actions and class action
notice, it is helpful to have an understanding of what class actions
are and how they implicate constitutional rights. Class actions are a
unique subset of litigation: litigating as a class does not give parties
21
any substantive rights, but instead puts them on a procedural path
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.1.
See infra Section III.B.2.
See infra Section III.B.3.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.B.
7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT

ET AL.,

FEDERAL PRACTICE

AND

PROCEDURE
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with steps in addition to those in litigation between individuals,
22
23
such as certification and notice.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 sets forth specialized rules
24
for class action litigation. Class actions allow “[o]ne or more
25
members of a class [to] sue or be sued as representative parties.”
One of the unique aspects of class action litigation is notice to class
members, as given in Rule 23(c)(2)(B): “For any class certified
under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to class members the
best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified through
26
reasonable effort.” The rule goes on to detail what the notice
must state, including “the binding effect of a class judgment on the
27
members under Rule 23(c)(3).”
The subdivision referred to in Rule 23(c)(2)(B), 23(b)(3),
28
became the only classes for which notice is mandatory. These
29
actions “are money damages class actions.” Rule 23(b)(3) gives
the requirements to maintain one of the three types of class
actions; in addition to the prerequisites given in 23(a), for a class
action under (b)(3), it must be the case that “questions of law or
fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
30
adjudicating the controversy.” The “best notice practicable”
languagewhich the court must do for 23(b)(3) class
actionscontrasts with the rule for 23(b)(1) and (2) class actions,
31
in which “the court may direct appropriate notice to the class.”
§ 1755, Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2015).
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1).
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(vii). Such a judgment must “include and
specify or describe those to whom the Rule 23(c)(2) notice was directed, who have
not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be class members.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(c)(3)(B).
28. See infra notes 69–88 and accompanying text (explaining 1966 and 2003
amendments to Rule 23 that resulted in the promulgation of Rule 23(c)(2)(B)).
29. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:47, Westlaw
(database updated Dec. 2015).
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added); see also RUBENSTEIN, supra
note 29, § 8:1 (mapping Rule 23’s notice provisions).
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This Comment only examines notice under 23(c)(2)(B).
However, many of the same issues discussed here—especially
complying with constitutional due process requirements through
notice—would be relevant to a court weighing whether to use its
discretionary power to direct notice, as well as what would
constitute “appropriate” notice. Class actions can also occur in state
courts, even when class members are non-residents, and state court
rules covering notice are usually very similar to, or even the same
32
as, the federal rule; class actions under state court rules are also
beyond the scope of this Comment.
Notice in class actions is particularly important because of
notice’s constitutional implications. The Fifth Amendment
provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
33
property, without due process of law” and the Fourteenth
Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person
34
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
35
Judgments and settlements in class actions bind the entire class,
36
even if a class member never knew of the litigation. This seems to
undermine the member’s constitutional due process rights:
Because the Constitution’s due process clauses are
generally construed to assure that an individual’s legally
protected rights cannot be adjudicated without providing
her with a day in court, there would seem to exist at least a
prima facie conflict between the dictates of procedural
due process and the collectivist goals of the class action
37
procedure.

32.

ABA PUBLISHING, AM. BAR ASS’N, FIFTY-STATE SURVEY: 2014–2015: THE LAW
(Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Fabrice Vincent eds., 2015).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
35. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 315 (2011) (“Neither a proposed
class action nor a rejected class action may bind nonparties. What does have this
effect is a class action approved under Rule 23.”).
36. See, e.g., Moralez v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 897 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1000
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (“Due process does not require that a class member actually
receive notice.”).
37. MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND
THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 135 (2009) (footnote omitted); 7AA
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1789.1 (3d ed.),
Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2015).
OF CLASS ACTION ix
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This grounding in constitutional rights is critical to the history
of the class action, and specifically to the use of class notice, as a
procedural mechanism.
B.

History of Class Action Litigation

While this Comment will not give an extensive history of class
action litigation, a brief history to supplement the introduction
38
above is helpful in understanding that the constitutional due
process issues implicated in class action notice techniques—who
may be in the litigation and who may be bound—are the issues that
have plagued class action jurisprudence since the beginning.
The idea of group litigation has a long history: while “it would
be a mistake to speak of an unbroken and unified eight-century
tradition,” there are medieval English antecedents of group
litigation, the understanding of which require understanding the
39
social context and ideas about representation. More directly, the
modern class action can be traced to seventeenth century English
40
legal developments. Further developments in legal procedure in
England continued the attempt to address issues of
practicalityfor example, issues of judicial resources created by
many suits centered on the same facts and justice, and, in cases
involving groups of litigants, issues of whether to bind parties
41
whose interests were affected by a case. By the early nineteenth
century, though “developed on an ad hoc basis, rather than from
one general uniform principle,” “the pressure of one set of rigid
rules and principles . . . and practical concerns . . . forged a relief
42
valve and the class action device was thus activated.”
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story was instrumental in
incorporating class action suits into the legal system in the United

38.
39.

See supra Section II.A.
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN
CLASS ACTION 38–40 (1987) (footnote omitted).
40. William Weiner & Delphine Szyndrowski, The Class Action, from the English
Bill of Peace to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23: Is There a Common Thread?, 8
WHITTIER L. REV. 935, 936 (1987) (discussing the Bill of Peace, which gave litigants
an option outside of rigid joinder rules); see also YEAZELL, supra note 39, at 24–25
(discussing the usual conclusions of scholars and lawyers about the history of the
modern class action, and arguing that ending the inquiry at the seventeenth
century for its origins “form[s] an incomplete and deceptive picture”).
41. Weiner & Szyndrowski, supra note 40, at 936–54.
42. Id. at 954.
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States during the first half of the nineteenth century. Like the
English legal system, Justice Story wrestled with issues of who could
or should be bound by the outcome of litigation, implicating the
44
interests of parties not before the court. In 1842, the Supreme
Court enacted Federal Equity Rule 48, which provided for group
45
representative litigation. However, the language of the rule itself
and the cases that followed contained contradictions about the
answers to questions of when such litigation could be used and who
46
was bound by it.
The history of class action procedural rules and case law took
47
more twists and turns before the original version of Federal Rule
48
of Civil Procedure 23 was promulgated in 1938. The original Rule
49
23 provided for three types of classes. However, once again, the
procedure of class action litigation “was beset with difficulties: (1)
obscure and uncertain definitions of categories; (2) the inadequacy
of the rule in dealing with the binding effect of judgments; and (3)
the failure of the rule to address measures assuring procedural
50
fairness.”
51
Rule 23 was therefore significantly changed in 1966 to
describe “in more practical terms, the occasions for maintaining
52
class actions.” The 1966 rule included three subsections in Rule

43. Id. at 955; YEAZELL, supra note 39, at 216.
44. Weiner & Szyndrowski, supra note 40, at 955–58; YEAZELL, supra note 39,
at 216–20.
45. Weiner & Szyndrowski, supra note 40, at 958–59; YEAZELL, supra note 39,
at 221.
46. Weiner & Szyndrowski, supra note 40, at 958–69; YEAZELL, supra note 39,
at 221–24. “[G]roup litigation entered the twentieth century as an oddity that even
the most learned did not profess to understand. . . . [T]he class suit, as it had
come to be called, was clearly good for something, even if no one could quite
figure out what.” YEAZELL, supra note 39, at 224.
47. Weiner & Szyndrowski, supra note 40, at 969–77; YEAZELL, supra note 39,
at 225–29.
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1938); Weiner & Szyndrowski, supra note 40, at 977
(quoting the original text of the rule in full).
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (1938); John G. Harkins, Jr., Federal Rule 23—The
Early Years, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 705, 706–07 (1997).
50. Weiner & Szyndrowski, supra note 40, at 979–80 (footnotes omitted).
51. Id. at 990; YEAZELL, supra note 39, at 238.
52. Weiner & Szyndrowski, supra note 40, at 990; see also 39 F.R.D. 69, 94–107
(1966) (containing the text of the superseded rule, the text of the rule as
amended, and the Advisory Committee’s Note, discussing the difficulties with the
original rule).
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23(b), each detailing situations in which representative litigation is
53
appropriate. “The unstated implication of Rule 23(b) is that there
are cases that satisfy the Rule 23(a) criteria—numerous individuals
with common questions whose rights are being pursued by an
adequate class representative with typical claims—but that are
54
unworthy of class certification on those grounds alone.” While the
55
1966 rule has not been free from problems or criticism, it remains
56
the core of the rule as it stands today.
The concept and general structure of modern class actions
57
have been the objects of much criticism and controversy; one
scholar described the commentary on the rule as “professional
58
heat.” Despite several sets of amendments to Rule 23, in addition
to the updates that rule made to its predecessors, “the same
problems that plagued class actions during its inception continue
59
to haunt the field.” Scholars acknowledge the positive aspects of
60
class actions, but find much to condemn.

53. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b); NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:1, Westlaw (database
updated Dec. 2015).
54. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:1, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2015).
55. Weiner & Szyndrowski, supra note 40, at 992 (“The cases and
commentators support the fact that the 1966 revision is beset with its own
difficulties, perhaps not unlike those found in the original rule.”); YEAZELL, supra
note 39, at 238.
56. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (providing the Advisory Committee Notes, outlining
each change made, for each amendment since 1937).
57. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 4–6 (2000) (outlining various groups of critics of class
actions and common criticism, while noting groups of supporters and their
reasons); REDISH, supra note 37, at ix (“I critique the class action procedure from
historical, political, and constitutional perspectives. . . . I find it seriously wanting
on all counts.”).
58. YEAZELL, supra note 39, at 238 (“Unlike its predecessors, however, the
new rule has generated a great deal of professional heat: enormous fights occur
over the subclassification into which a particular class action falls; academic writers
engage in hyperbolic praise and denunciation of the device; and factions of
professional associations debate whether class actions should be curtailed or
expanded.”).
59. Jade Brewster, A Kick in the Class: Giving Class Members a Voice in Class
Action Settlements, 41 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013).
60. REDISH, supra note 37, at 1–2 (“The potential benefits of the class action,
to both litigants and the legal system as a whole are substantial. . . . [But] the
modern class action may give rise to as much harm as good; if not properly
controlled it may wreak havoc on the legal system and the values that underlie it.
Some have charged that the class proceeding has often been employed as a form
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Settlement class actions, a newer development where both
parties come to court with a request for certification of a class
62
conditional upon approval of an already reached settlement, are
especially controversial. “A number of respected courts and
scholars . . . have sounded cautionary notes about the practice,
suggesting that the settlement class action brings with it serious
risks of collusion and unfairness that ultimately disadvantage absent
63
class members.” Settlement class actions have become very
64
common, so the possibility of unfairness in them is an important
issue in modern class action jurisprudence. This possibility of
unfairness recalls the possibility of constitutional problems that all
65
class actions carry.
From its conception in English group litigation to its current
state as embodied in Rule 23 and as practiced with newer methods
like the settlement class action, the class action has stumbled in its
attempt to accommodate the various interests present in any
dispute and the unique difficulties of adjudicating the claims of a
66
group while trying to protect the constitutional rights of all. These
difficulties are especially apparent in the history of class action
67
notice.

of legalized blackmail. . . . Others have pointed to the danger of a perverse kind of
‘race to the bottom.’”).
61. Id. at 177.
62. Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the
Case-or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 545, 546 (2006).
63. Id. at 547; see also REDISH, supra note 37, at 177; Brewster, supra note 59, at
3 (proposing “a solution to the potential for unfairness under the current
procedures for approving settlements in the class action context”).
64. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their
Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 819 (2010), http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials
/2012_aba_annual/12_6.authcheckdam.pdf (finding that settlement classes
constituted sixty-eight percent of federal class action settlements in 2006 and
2007).
65. See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text.
66. See supra Section II.B; infra Section II.C.
67. See infra Section II.C.
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History of Class Action Notice

Since the notice requirements of Rule 23(c)(2)(B) are, in the
68
grand scheme of legal history, relatively new, there is much less
history behind class action notice than behind class actions in
general. However, even the short history of class action notice is
significant since it shows the centrality of constitutional due process
principles in class notice.
While there was no notice requirement for classes involving
unknown parties prior to 1966, notice in such cases does have
history beyond the promulgation of the amended rule, and even
69
beyond its predecessor 1938 rule. There was no discussion of
70
notice in nineteenth-century American or early English cases, but
in 1908, the Supreme Court expressed concern about binding
judgments against persons who were not aware of the litigation:
The allegation that the suit is brought in behalf of all who
should join and share in the expense cannot make the
judgment binding on those who do not join. Some . . . ,
possibly, had never heard of the pendency of the suit. It is
clear if such suits . . . could have the effect here claimed
for them, and the judgments in them were binding in all
courts against all other persons of the same class, that
71
injustice might result.”
Despite the Supreme Court’s recognition of the possibility for
injustice to those bound by group litigation, there was no notice
72
requirement for some years.
Direction to provide notice first appeared in the 1938 Rule 23,
in which notice of dismissal or compromise was required for the
“true” category of class actions, but the court had discretion over
73
what notice would entail. For the other categories, notice was
74
given only if the court required it. Since this notice rule provided

68. See supra Section II.B.
69. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1938), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1966).
70. Weiner & Szyndrowski, supra note 40, at 963 n.177.
71. Wabash R. Co. v. Adelbert Coll. of W. Reserve Univ., 208 U.S. 38, 58
(1908).
72. Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (1938) (providing a notice requirement).
73. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (1938) (“If the right sought to be enforced is one
defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of this rule notice of the proposed
dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner
as the court directs.”).
74. Id.
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only for proposed resolutions of a suit, and only for certain kinds of
resolutions—proposed dismissal or compromise, but not
judgment—it therefore offered little opportunity for a potential
class member to learn of and make a decision about individual
75
action before the conclusion of the class action. Considering the
discretionary nature of notice for the other two types of classes
under the 1938 Rule 23, the rule overall provided little protection
against an individual having her interests litigated against her
76
wishes.
Soon after the 1938 introduction of Rule 23, a number of
77
courts, including once again the Supreme Court, raised concerns
78
about due process. As the Second Circuit noted, scholars were
showing “strong support” for the idea that class action suits could
have “more decisive and binding effect” but still meet
constitutional due process principles if there had been “adequate
79
steps to notify and bring in all those in interest.”
These concerns were finally addressed in the 1966
amendments to Rule 23. In the Advisory Committee Notes, the
Committee stated:
[N]otice must be ordered, and is not merely
discretionary, to give the members in a subdivision (b)(3)
class action an opportunity to secure exclusion from the
class. This mandatory notice pursuant to subdivision
80
(c)(2), together with any discretionary notice which the
court may find it advisable to give under subdivision
(d)(2), is designed to fulfill requirements of due process
81
to which the class action procedure is of course subject.

75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (quoting Wabash, 208 U.S. at
58).
78. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment
(citing cases, beginning with Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940)); see also infra
notes 87–92 and accompanying text.
79. Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973, 979 (2d Cir. 1952).
80. The “best notice practicable under the circumstances” standard was first
codified in Rule 23(c)(2). FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) advisory committee’s note to 1966
amendment. The 2003 amendments resulted in the notification requirements for
classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3), becoming the present Rule 23(c)(2)(B).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment; see also infra
note 82 and accompanying text.
81. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.

10. Scheibel_FF4 (1331-1362) (Do Not Delete)

2016]

#RULE23 #CLASSACTION #NOTICE

6/24/2016 11:28 AM

1343

The 2003 amendments to the rule, when Rule 23(c) became
the present Rule 23(c)(2)(B), recognized the differing notice
82
needs of the different types of classes.
The Supreme Court addressed the 1966 notice requirements
83
in Rule 23(c)(2) in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin. The Court rejected
the notice plan adopted by the district court and held that
individual notice was required for the 2,250,000 class members
84
whose names and addresses were known or easily ascertainable.
The Court pointed to the Advisory Committee’s description of Rule
23(c)(2) as “not merely discretionary” and its concern about
85
fulfilling requirements of due process. The Court took note of the
Advisory Committee’s reference to Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
86
& Trust Co. and highlighted that case’s statement “that notice and
an opportunity to be heard were fundamental requisites of the
87
constitutional guarantee of procedural due process.” The
Supreme Court went on to quote Mullane’s strong statement about
notice: “But when notice is a person’s due, process which is a mere
gesture is not due process. . . . The reasonableness and hence the
constitutional validity of any chosen method may be defended on
the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those
88
affected.” The Supreme Court’s discussion of notice in Eisen
solidifies that any method chosen for class action notice must be
justifiable against constitutional due process standards.
Forty years after Eisen, however, concerns remain about
89
whether class notice is meeting the standards of due process.
82. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment (“For
several reasons, there may be less need for notice [in a (b)(1) or (b)(2) class
action] than in a (b)(3) class action. There is no right to request exclusion from a
(b)(1) or (b)(2) class. The characteristics of the class may reduce the need for
formal notice. The cost of providing notice, moreover, could easily cripple actions
that do not seek damages. The court may decide not to direct notice after
balancing the risk that notice costs may deter the pursuit of class relief against the
benefits of notice.”).
83. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
84. Id. at 175.
85. Id. at 173 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) advisory committee’s note to
1966 amendment).
86. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
87. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 174 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314).
88. Id. (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315).
89. Stephanie J. Bowser, Collateral Attacks Upon Class Action Judgments: Ending
the Scope of Review Debate by Addressing the Underlying Notice Problems, 13 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 631, 647 (2008) (“[The] broad language [of Rule 23(c)(B)(2)
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“There are no precise rules as to what constitutes adequate notice,
and the due process standards have been held to vary depending
90
on the circumstances of each case.” Rule 23(c)(2)(B)’s standard is
91
supposed to be flexible yet obedient to the Constitution; the rule’s
“practicable under the circumstances” language allows
accommodation of the particularity of each case while the language
specifying that it must be the “best notice” gives notice the import
that a procedure so closely tied with constitutional due process
92
rights requires.
III. CLASS ACTION NOTICE IN PRACTICE
A.

Traditional Means of Notice

Rule 23(c)(2)(B) does not tell courts how notice should be
given; instead, it gives the “best notice that is practicable under the
93
circumstances” standard. This Comment will now review the
and interpreting Supreme Court cases] leaves substantial room for interpreting
what satisfies due process. The least demanding and least protective of absentee
class members’ right to notice standard has since generally prevailed.”); Todd B.
Hilsee et al., Do You Really Want Me to Know My Rights? The Ethics Behind Due Process
in Class Action Notice Is More Than Just Plain Language: A Desire to Actually Inform, 18
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1359, 1360 (2005) (arguing that “a great number of notices
and notice programs leave class members without adequate notice of their rights,
and defendants without the res judicata effect desired”). See generally 7AA CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1786, Westlaw (database
updated Apr. 2015).
90. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1090 (2d Cir. 1971).
91. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 8:12, Westlaw (database updated Dec.
2015) (concluding that courts have read Rule 23(c)’s requirements to enable
some flexibility and pointing to the “oft-cited” case of In re Nissan Motor Corp.
Antitrust Litigation, 552 F.2d 1088, 1104 (5th Cir. 1977)); see also Jennifer Mingus,
Note, E-Mail: A Constitutional (and Economical) Method of Transmitting Class Action
Notice, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 87, 102 (1999) (describing due process as a flexible
concept).
92. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added). But see Frank L. Maraist
& T. Page Sharp, Federal Procedure’s Troubled Marriage: Due Process and the Class
Action, 49 TEX. L. REV. 1, 14 (1970) (arguing that, among other due process
problems, the standard in the 1966 Rule 23(c)(2) “directs the attention of the
court away from the requirements of due process and towards the illogical
consideration of the ease or difficulty that will be encountered in giving actual
notice”).
93. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Note, however, that the rule does specify
what the notice must contain, including, among other details, the binding nature
of a judgment on class members. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(vii). These
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traditional methods of providing notice and how those methods
have, or have not, changed since Rule 23(c)(2)(B) was
promulgated. The societal context and costs of these methods will
also be described.
Though Mullane was decided before the 1966 Rule 23
amendments, because both Mullane and Eisen indicated approval of
notice consisting of first-class mail to class members identifiable by
reasonable efforts and newspaper publication, these methods
became established as sufficient to satisfy the Rule 23(c)(2)(B)
94
standard and therefore as the traditional notice methods.
95
Television and radio use is also regularly approved. Yet, despite
the popularity of television in the United States and its widespread
96
use for notice, it is not accepted by courts as widely as print media.
Physical mail and newspaper publication are still used and easily
97
accepted by the courts.
requirements were part of the 2003 amendments to Rule 23(c). Like the standards
for notice means, the requirements of what information must be included,
especially the statement about the binding nature of judgments, have due process
implications. See Hilsee et al., supra note 89, at 1365 (“[M]any class action notices
do not adequately explain concepts that are foreign to average people.”).
94. E.g., Wolfert ex rel. Estate of Wolfert v. Transamerica Home First, Inc.,
439 F.3d 165, 176 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[U]se of first-class mail [as opposed to other
classes of mail] to send a required notice has regularly been upheld.”); Zimmer
Paper Prods., Inc. v. Berger & Montague, P.C., 758 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1985) (“It
is well settled that in the usual situation first-class mail and publication in the press
fully satisfy the notice requirements of both [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule] 23 and the due process clause.”).
95. See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in Gulf of Mex.,
on Apr. 20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 939 (E.D. La. 2012) (finding that the notice
program including local radio and television advertisements, among other
communications, satisfied Rule 23(c)(2)); In re Black Farmers Discrimination
Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2011) (describing and approving notice that
included advertisements on “two national radio stations with large AfricanAmerican audiences and 52 local radio stations located in areas with high
concentrations of African-American farmers”); see also NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS
§ 8:30, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2015) (“[C]ourts continue to approve
notice programs that include advertisements aired on television and radio.”).
96. Jordan S. Ginsberg, Comment, Class Action Notice: The Internet’s Time Has
Come, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 739, 750 (2003).
97. See, e.g., Badia v. HomeDeliveryLink, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-07097, 2015 WL
5666077, at *7 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2015) (finding that Rule 23(c)(2), as well as Rule
23(e), notice requirements were met by sending forms to class members
appearing in defendant’s corporate records and publishing notice of the
settlement in English and Spanish New Jersey newspapers, but including no
discussion of why those notice methods were superior to others under the
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However, the importance of these media in U.S. society has
waned. Weekday newspaper circulation has dropped significantly in
the last decade: “[N]ewspapers, after an unusual year of small gains
in 2013, saw both daily and Sunday circulation fall another 3% in
2014, declines that were felt across papers of all sizes. Newspaper
98
weekday circulation has now fallen 19% since 2004.” First-class
mail volume has also declined from 98.1 billion in 2005 to 63.6
99
billion in 2014. The effectiveness of newspaper and other print
media publication notice has been questioned several times since
100
the advent of the internet.
101
Traditional notice means can also have high costs. Cost is
not part of the Rule 23(c) notice standards, and in Eisen, the
Supreme Court specifically rejected dispensing with individual
notice of identifiable class members when the notice would be very
102
expensive. However, even though the Supreme Court noted that
“[t]here is nothing in Rule 23 to suggest that the notice
requirements can be tailored to fit the pocketbooks of particular
103
plaintiffs,” cost of notice is still a factor when courts evaluate a
circumstances (citing Zimmer Paper Prods., Inc. v. Berger & Montague, P.C., 758
F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1985))).
98. Amy Mitchell, State of the News Media 2015, PEW RES. CTR. JOURNALISM &
MEDIA (Apr. 19, 2015), http://www.journalism.org/2015/04/29/state-of-the-news
-media-2015/.
99. A Decade of Facts and Figures, U.S. POSTAL SERV., https://about.usps.com
/who-we-are/postal-facts/decade-of-facts-and-figures.htm (last visited May 7,
2016). A decline in the use of mail does not necessarily mean that mail is less likely
to reach intended recipients, but it does indicate that it is not the preferred
method of communication in as many circumstances as it used to be, calling into
question its utility as the “best notice practicable” in many circumstances.
100. Robert H. Klonoff, Mark Herrmann & Bradley W. Harrison, Making Class
Actions Work: The Untapped Potential of the Internet, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 727, 731–33
(2008) (describing problems with mail, newspapers, and television for notice
purposes); Brian Walters, “Best Notice Practicable” in the Twenty-First Century, 2003
UCLA J.L. & TECH. 4, 28 (2003) (“While technology and the ability to send notice
in better ways moves forward, many courts continue to look backward and adhere
to conceptions of notice that are technologically outdated.”); Ginsberg, supra note
96, at 753 (“Courts mistakenly assume, without engaging in a thorough analysis of
statistical data, that print media publication is the most accessible, fair, and
efficient means of appealing to a large group of geographically diverse individuals.
The numbers, however, do not bear out that assumption.”).
101. Ginsberg, supra note 96, at 753–55, 759–60 (detailing the costs, as of
2003, of national print media and television advertising).
102. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175–76 (1974).
103. Id. at 176.
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105

notice plan. Most often, a plaintiff class bears the cost of notice,
therefore expensive notice schemes can significantly reduce the
recovery available to class members and even the desire of class
106
members to pursue the litigation.
Despite the decline in, and problems associated with, notice by
107
mail, newspapers, radio, and television, courts continue to use
these communications methods without seriously evaluating and
explicitly showing how they meet the “best notice practicable under
108
the circumstances” standard.
If courts are considering and
rejecting other notice methods, their orders often do not reflect
109
those conclusions.

104. Larson v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 687 F.3d 109, 128 (3d Cir. 2012)
(comparing cost per class member of individual notice with such costs in Supreme
Court cases examining notice); In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 552 F.2d
1088, 1099 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[R]easonableness [in undertaking notice] is a
function of anticipated results, costs, and amount involved.”); Ginsberg, supra note
96, at 751 (contrasting cases where cost of notice, especially in relation to the
anticipated recovery for the class, was a factor in the courts’ determinations of
appropriateness of proposed publication notice).
105. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178–79 (“The usual rule is that a plaintiff must initially
bear the cost of notice to the class . . . the plaintiff must pay for the cost of notice
as part of the ordinary burden of financing his own suit.”). The Supreme Court
later held that, while the plaintiff is usually responsible for notice and the
principle from Eisen remains, there are cases where defendants should be
responsible for performing and paying for notice tasks, and district courts may
properly exercise their discretion over allocation of such decisions. See
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 356–59 (1978).
106. Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137,
1169 (2009) (noting that the expense of class notification can be a deterrent, for
both class representatives and class counsel, to pursuing class action claims);
William Weiner, The Class Action, the Federal Court and the Upper Class: Is Notice, and
Its Consequent Cost, Really Necessary?, 22 CAL. W. L. REV. 31, 33–35 (1985) (observing
that if the class representative must pay for the notice and the cost is high, only
wealthy litigants and those with large claims will pursue claims, and describing the
result in Eisen as unfair); Ginsberg, supra note 96, at 751–52.
107. See supra Section III.A.
108. See Badia v. HomeDeliveryLink, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-07097, 2015 WL
5666077, at *7 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2015); see also Hilsee et al., supra note 89, at 1360
(stating that weak notice “programs are presented to and approved by courts
without evidence”).
109. Under Rule 23, the judgment order need not review the details of
approvals or rejections of notice schemes that occurred during the course of the
litigation, but “the judgment in a class action must: . . . (B) for any class certified
under Rule 23(b)(3), include and specify or describe to whom the Rule23(c)(2)
notice was directed. . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3). Judges may detail the reasoning
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Use of Newer Communication Technologies in Class Action Notice

While continuing to rely heavily on traditional notice means in
110
courts have used newer communication
class action suits,
technologies as well. Current communication technologies include
email, websites, social media, and text messaging. The level of
judicial comfort with these technologies, however, varies greatly
within and among various technologies.
1.

Email and the Internet

Over just two short decades, the use of the internet has
become the norm for American adults, eighty-four percent of
111
whom use the internet. Email is also widely used: as of 2011,
ninety-two percent of online adult Americans, and seventy percent
112
of all Americans, use email.
Websites, for notice purposes, can mean two types of sites.
First, there are sites created specifically and exclusively to provide
113
information about the class action litigation.
Second,
advertisements may be placed on existing websites in order to
behind approval and rejection of notice plans in orders specifically related to
approving notice. However, courts approving a class action settlement must find that
the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). “To
determine whether a settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate . . . courts must
conclude that notice was adequate under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
23(c)(2) and 23(e).” Badia, 2015 WL 5666077, at *4.
110. See supra Section III.A.
111. Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Americans’ Internet Access: 2000–2015,
PEW RES. CTR. (June 26, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/06/26
/americans-internet-access-2000-2015/ (showing internet use rising from fifty
percent of American adults in 2000 to eighty-four percent in 2013 to 2015).
112. Kristin Purcell, Search and Email Still Top the List of Most Popular Online
Activities, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/2011/08/09
/search-and-email-still-top-the-list-of-most-popular-online-activities/. While most
Americans use the internet, certain demographic groups—such as the elderly,
African-Americans and Hispanics, people in rural areas, and people in low
household incomes—have lower rates of internet use. Monica Anderson &
Andrew Perrin, 15% of Americans Don’t Use the Internet. Who Are They?, PEW RES. CTR.
(July 28, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/07/28/15-of
-americans-dont-use-the-internet-who-are-they/.
FIVEFINGERS
CLASS
ACTION,
https://
113. See,
e.g.,
VIBRAM
www.fivefingerssettlement.com/ (last visited May 7, 2015) (including sections with
basic case information, including a chart on “Your Legal Rights and Options,”
frequently asked questions, case documents, tools to file a claim, and contact
information).
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effect publication notice, much like advertisements placed in print
114
media.
The first use of the internet for class action notice was in
115
1997. The use of email and websites in class action notice plans is
116
now fairly common practice. These internet communications are
117
often combined with more traditional means of notice, but may
118
be used alone.
However, some cases do not incorporate such electronic
methods, instead using only traditional means. Some do so without
explaining why those means were the “best,” and thus better than
119
electronic means, under Rule 23(c)(2)(B). On the other hand,

114. See, e.g., Jermyn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., No. 08 Civ. 00214, 2010 WL
5187746, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2010) (approving notice on Best Buy’s website, in
part because it “is similar to publishing notice in a nationwide newspaper”); In re
Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351, 385 (E.D.
Penn. Apr. 22, 2015) (approving settlement of class action where notice included
advertisements on “popular” websites, including CNN, Facebook, Weather.com,
and Yahoo!).
115. Ginsberg, supra note 96, at 741 n.16.
116. See Palma v. Metropcs Wireless, Inc., No. 8:13-CV-698-T-33MAP, 2014 WL
235478, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2014) (“A number of courts have determined that
email is an inexpensive and appropriate means of delivering notice of an action to
a class.”); Theodore Z. Wyman, Annotation, Sufficiency of Legal Notice Provided by
Online Publication or Electronic Mail in Class Action Suits, 84 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 103, pt. I
§§ 1–2 (2014) (“The creation and implementation of dedicated class action
litigation or class settlement websites have become a common and essential part of
modern class action notification programs. . . . A large group of decisions have
ratified class notification plans . . . that include an element of online publication . .
. often part-and-parcel with more traditional publication notice.”); MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.311 (2004) (“Many courts include the
Internet as a component of class certification and class settlement notice
programs.”).
117. See, e.g., Morey v. Louis Vuitton N. Am., Inc., No. 11cv1517 WQH, 2014
WL 109194, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2014) (finding notice that included emailed
notice, mailed notice, website publication, and newspaper publication complied
with Rule 23).
118. In re Pool Prods. Distrib. Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 310 F.R.D. 300, 307 n.34
(E.D. La. Aug. 31, 2015) (approving notice plan using email, along with
publication in newspapers and on websites, and concluding that, in this case,
mailed notice to additional possible class members was “impracticable and
unreasonable given the total amount of the settlement”).
119. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307
F.R.D. at 385 (approving notice via first-class mail and noting that it was well
settled that such mail usually fulfills the requirements of Rule 23 and
constitutional due process, but not discussing why email was not used or why first-
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some cases provide explanations for rejecting the use of email or
for subordinating it to first-class mail: explanations include
120
concerns about email being “disruptive” and invasive of privacy;
121
concerns about an email communication’s trustworthiness; and
122
lack of showing that email would be better than mail. Overall, the
use of email, especially when proposed as a substitute to traditional
notice means, has been more controversial than the use of websites
123
for publication.
Websites and email are also useful for other aspects of class
124
action litigation, particularly participation by class members.
Both email and websites can be used to facilitate communication
between parties and attorneys that goes beyond the notice
125
mandated by Rule 23(c)(2)(B) or directed by courts. Websites
126
are used as claims administration tools and could also be used as

class mail was the “best” notice in the circumstances); Dick v. Sprint Commc’ns
Co. L.P., 297 F.R.D. 283, 292 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (finding that notice through direct
mailings, as part of a larger notice scheme, satisfied Rule 23(c)(2)(B) without
discussing why email was not considered for notice).
120. Hart v. U.S. Bank NA, No. CV 12-2471-PHX-JAT, 2013 WL 5965637, at *6
(D. Ariz. Nov. 8, 2013); see also Lewis v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, No.
C2-11-CV-0058, 2011 WL 8960489, at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 20, 2011) (ordering
email notice to former employees, but not for current employees because
defendant likely had accurate addresses for those potential class members, making
disclosure of their email addresses an unnecessary intrusion on privacy).
121. See Karvaly v. eBay, Inc., 245 F.R.D. 71, 91 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (concluding
that “notification by electronic mail creates risks of distortion or misleading
notification that are substantially reduced when first-class mail is used” (citing
Reab v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 214 F.R.D. 623, 630–31 (D. Colo. 2002)). But see Lewis,
2011 WL 8960489, at *2 (concluding that the concern in Karvaly and Reab about
distortion of email is unpersuasive).
122. Minter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 283 F.R.D. 268, 274 (D. Md. 2012)
(denying notice via email through defendant’s billing system because plaintiffs
had not shown that email would be less difficult and expensive compared to direct
mail, and because defendant likely only had “email addresses for a minority of
class members”).
123. See 3 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 8:30, Westlaw
(database updated Dec. 2015).
124. See generally Klonoff, Herrmann & Harrison, supra note 100, at 730
(offering proposals for “integrating the internet into virtually every aspect of the
class action process”). “The internet has become entrenched in the American way
of life and provides a mechanism through which absent class members’ right to
participate meaningfully in class action litigation can be realized.” Id. at 729.
125. Id. at 762–68.
126. Id. at 751–52.
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a federally designated repository of class action information.
128
Courts could also webcast class action proceedings.
2.

127

Social Media
129

130

Social media began just under twenty years ago, but it has
become very popular: in only ten years, the percentage of
American adults using social networking sites went from seven to
131
sixty-five percent. Social media sites generally allow users to
display their own content, view others’ profiles and content, and
132
publish reactions to what other users are doing. Many social
media sites allow users to send and receive private messages in a
133
134
manner similar to email, and many also display advertising.
127. Id. at 756.
128. Id. at 757–62.
129. “[M]ost people define [social media] as the ability to use the internet to
share and communicate instantly with others, even across great distances.” Keith
Terrell, The History of Social Media, HISTORY COOPERATIVE (June 16, 2015),
http://historycooperative.org/the-history-of-social-media; see also Susan C. Hudson
& Karla K. Roberts (Camp), Drafting and Implementing an Effective Social Media Policy,
18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 767, 769 (2012) (“[N]o standard definition exists
because the forums and applications change so rapidly. Though there is no
standard definition, it is generally agreed that social media is a form of electronic
communication that allows user-generated interaction between the media’s
creator and the user.”).
130. See Terrell, supra note 129; see also Drew Hendricks, Complete History of
Social Media: Then and Now, SMALL BUS. TRENDS (May 8, 2013), http://
smallbiztrends.com/2013/05/the-complete-history-of-social-media-infographic
.html (“The first social media site that everyone can agree actually was social
media . . . lasted from 1997 to 2001.”).
131. Andrew Perrin, Social Media Usage: 2005–2015, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 8,
2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/08/social-networking-usage-2005
-2015. “Social media” and “social networking” are not precisely the same, but the
differences are not important to the discussion in this Comment. See Hudson &
Roberts (Camp), supra note 129, at 769 (citing Lon S. Cohen, Is There a Difference
Between Social Networking and Social Media?, COHENSIDE (Mar. 3, 2009), http://
cohenside.blogspot.com/2009/03/is-there-difference-between-social.html).
132. See, e.g., What Is a Facebook Page?, FACEBOOK HELP CTR., https://
www.facebook.com/help/174987089221178 (last visited May 7, 2016) (describing
the purpose of a Facebook page for an organization); What Is My Profile?,
FACEBOOK HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com/help/133986550032744 (last
visited May 7, 2016) (describing a Facebook profile); New User FAQs, TWITTER HELP
CTR., https://support.twitter.com/articles/13920 (last visited May 7, 2016)
(describing how users communicate using Twitter).
133. See Nitin Bhandari, The Rise of the Private Message on Social Media,
SOCIOBITS.ORG (Sept. 6, 2015), http://www.sociobits.org/2015/09/the-rise-of-the
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Many sites also have tagging features that aid users in finding
135
information.
136
Despite the popularity of social media and the fact that at its
core, social media—like mail, television, and newspapers—is a
137
means of communication, courts have been hesitant to allow use
of its full capabilities for class action notice purposes. Even when
social media is used, it is somewhat common for courts to view
social media sites in the same way as websites—where sites display
passive, general advertisements—by listing traditional websites and
social media sites together when describing a notice plan, thus
grouping the two categories together as the same type of
138
communication. It is not clear if such notice publication is
utilizing targeted advertising and other sophisticated tools based on
139
the large amounts of personal data that the sites collect.
In contrast, some cases have used social media tools that allow
for more targeted contacting of potential class members, such as in

-private-message-on-social-media/3472.
134. See Shea Bennett, Social Media Ad Spending: Statistics & Trends
[INFOGRAPHIC], ADWEEK BLOG NETWORK (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.adweek.com
/socialtimes/social-ad-spend-stats-trends/503712 (noting that “[s]ocial media
advertising is big business” and that Facebook and Twitter are more popular with
marketers).
135. See Rebecca Hiscott, The Beginner’s Guide to the Hashtag, MASHABLE (Oct. 8,
2013),
http://mashable.com/2013/10/08/what-is-hashtag/#RsGfrJGbeuqT
(explaining that “the pound sign (or hash) turns any word or group of words that
directly follow it into a searchable link” and discussing six social media platforms
that support its use).
136. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (defining social media as a way
to communicate).
138. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. SACV 10-00061-CJC, 2013 WL
3213832, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2013) (approving settlement where the notice
plan included, among other aspects, “hundreds of highly trafficked websites
including Facebook.com and Yahoo.com”); In re Imprelis Herbicide Mktg., Sales
Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 296 F.R.D. 351, 363 & n.6 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (finding
that the notice program satisfied Rule 23 and noting that, in addition to the
“[n]early 69,000 potential class members [who] received direct notice of the
settlement, . . . tens of thousands of others were notified by publication,” including
through advertisements on “AOL, Facebook, Yahoo!, Google, and other sites,” and
“108,416 unique visitors had viewed the [s]ettlement website”).
139. See Johnson, 2013 WL 3213832, at *4 and In re Imprelis Herbicide Mktg, 296
F.R.D. at 363 n.6, for an example of two cases that do not describe whether a
notice plan that included use of Facebook used advertisements targeted to
particular categories of users.
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140

Kelly v. Phiten USA, Inc. In Kelly, “[n]otice was displayed on
Phiten’s Facebook page, which delivered individual e-mail
notification to its more than 75,000 fans and also appeared on each
141
fan’s Facebook homepage.”
Though it did not reach the stage of being a Rule 23 class
action suit, Mark v. Gawker Media LLC took a novel step that may
have class action implications when it allowed plaintiffs to “follow”
potential opt-in plaintiffs on Twitter, though they could not
142
“friend” them on Facebook. Earlier in the litigation, Gawker
argued that Twitter should not be used since there was no evidence
that potential collective members would receive notice that way,
but the court was unconvinced: “the Court finds it unrealistic that
Defendant’s former interns do not maintain social media accounts;
the vast majority likely have at least one such account, if not
143
more.” At least one other case has acknowledged the potential
utility of social media for contacting potential class members
144
directly.
Courts seem more comfortable using newer technologies when
the suit itself has some kind of relationship to use of the
technology. An early example of this type of reasoning supporting
use of notice via email appeared in a class action suit against the
145
website PayPal. Despite previous reservations about using email as

140. 277 F.R.D. 564 (S.D. Iowa 2011).
141. Id. at 569. The success of these notifications is not assured; Facebook
users can control whether or not Facebook can send email and text messages at
all, and, to some extent, which notifications are allowed. Notification Basics &
Settings, FACEBOOK HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com/help/327994277286267
(last visited May 7, 2016).
142. Mark v. Gawker Media LLC, No. 13 Civ. 04347, 2015 WL 2330274, at
*1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2015); see also Kang, supra note 9.
143. Mark v. Gawker Media LLC, No. 13 Civ. 04347, 2014 WL 5557489, at
*4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2014).
144. See Angell v. City of Oakland, No. 13-CV-00190 NC, 2015 WL 65501, at *4,
11 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2015) (approving notice plan that included directly
contacting class members who were unresponsive to a mailed communication,
such as phone, email, Facebook, and Twitter). Another interesting issue, similar to
that of using social media for class notice, is the utility and appropriateness of
using social media for service of court papers. See Jacob Gershman, Plaintiff Can
Use Facebook to Notify Ex-Wife of Lawsuit, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2016, 4:58 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/01/22/plaintiff-can-use-facebook-to-notify-ex-wife
-of-lawsuit.
145. Farinella v. Paypal, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 2d 250, 257 n.10 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
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the primary method for notifying class members, the court found
that notice by email was appropriate:
[T]he Court is satisfied that potential class members in
this case are uniquely suited for email notification
because (1) their interactions with the defendants have
exclusively or predominantly been via email and over the
internet and (2) while the email addresses associated with
their PayPal accounts have been verified by the
146
defendants, their mailing addresses have not.
Similarly, when a party to a class suit is itself a social media
platform, using the communication options in that platform can be
147
a large part of providing notice. In Evans v. Linden Research, Inc., a
suit involving a class of individuals who participated in the internet
virtual-world Second Life, the court approved a notice plan that
included notice “on Facebook targeting individuals who have
148
expressed an interest in Second Life.”
While some cases indicate a willingness to accept use of social
media, the limited number of cases and the limited ways that some
of those cases used social media indicate that such platforms are far
from being a standard part of the class action notice toolbox.
3.

Text Messaging

Text messaging has become a popular method of
communication: eighty-five percent of American adults own a cell
phone, and eighty percent of cell phone owners use their phones
149
Text messaging may be
to send or receive text messages.

146. Id.
147. See Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2012) (approving
settlement of class action where, with Facebook as the defendant, the class
consisted of Facebook users, and Facebook provided notice through email to
individual class members and posting “notice of the settlement in the ‘Updates’
section of members’ personal Facebook accounts,” in addition to publishing
notice in USA Today).
148. Evans v. Linden Research, Inc., No. C-11-01078 DMR, 2013 WL 5781284,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013).
149. Maeve Duggan & Lee Rainie, Cell Phone Activities 2012, PEW RES. CTR.
(Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/11/25/cell-phone-activities
-2012/. Globally, seventy-five percent of those who own a cell phone regularly use
text messaging. Global Digital Communication: Texting, Social Networking Popular
Worldwide, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/12/20/global-digital
-communication-texting-social-networking-popular-worldwide/ (last updated Feb.
29, 2012).
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150

displacing other forms of communication, such as voice calls and
151
email.
Like courts’ infrequent use of social media’s capabilities
152
beyond general banner advertisements, courts have rarely used
text messaging. In In re Penthouse Executive Club Compensation
Litigation, while notice was sent via first-class mail, the claims
153
administrator also sent two text messages to class members.
However, in some cases where the phone numbers of class
members were likely known, since the litigation itself centered on
phone calls, text messaging was not used, and the court did not
offer any comment on the possibility of using text messaging for
154
notice.
In sum, even when courts allow use of email, websites, social
media, and text messaging, there are often still traditional
components to the notice plan. Notice plans that otherwise rely
heavily on internet advertising and email may still include physical
mail and more traditional publication notice, and there may be
155
little discussion of why each component is necessary.
150. Hope Yen, Popularity of Texting Edges Out Cell Phone Calls, HUFFINGTON
POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/15/popularity-of-texting-edg_n
_392721.html (last updated May 25, 2011) (noting the increase in text-messaging,
especially among teens, and the decrease in the length of phone calls).
151. Alex Mindlin, The Decline of Web-Based E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/07/business/media/07drill.html?_r=0
(reporting that young internet users are communicating through text messaging
and Facebook rather than email).
152. See supra Section III.B.2.
153. In re Penthouse Exec. Club Comp. Litig., No. 10 CIV. 1145 KMW, 2014
WL 185628, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2014).
154. See Reed v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., No. 12-CV-02359 JM BGS, 2014 WL
29011, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2014) (approving settlement where notice to class of
persons whose confidential phone calls had been intentionally recorded included
physically mailed notices and publication in newspapers in relevant geographic
areas); Spillman v. RPM Pizza, LLC, No. CIV.A. 10-349-BAJ, 2013 WL 2286076, at
*2 (M.D. La. May 23, 2013) (noting that a testifying notice expert considered
giving direct notice to a class of persons who received automated telephone calls
(“robo-calls”) to their cellular phone numbers through the “reverse appends”
method, where names and addresses associated with known phone numbers are
sought, but concluded it was too costly and ineffective and instead used a notice
plan including press releases and ads on general interest websites).
155. See, e.g., Fleisher v. Fiber Composites, LLC, No. CIV.A. 12-1326, 2014 WL
866441, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2014) (approving settlement of class action
involving purchasers of defective decking material where notice included direct
notice via email and direct mail using information in defendant’s records, as well
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IV. DOES RULE 23(C)(2)(B) REQUIRE USE OF NEWER
TECHNOLOGIES LIKE SOCIAL MEDIA?
Even though social media and text messaging are now
undeniably very popular, when considering whether they should be
used for class action notice, the directive of the rule remains
paramount. The directive of Rule 23(c)(2)(B) is such that it often
requires use of newer technologies. The scarce use of newer
technologies, however, suggests that courts do not adequately assess
notice plans’ compliance with the standard in the rule. This
appears to be in part because courts lack meaningful
measurements of best notice. Therefore, courts need to take better
control of notice plans and more carefully police compliance with
the rule.
A.

Rule 23(c)(2)(B), by Its Plain Language, Often Requires Use of Newer
Communications Technologies

“Does Rule 23(c)(2)(B) require use of newer technologies like
social media?” Of course not. Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires that class
members be sent “the best notice that is practicable under the
circumstances.”
However, courts’ continued reliance on physical mail and
publication in print media means that courts are not always doing
what Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires. Relying heavily on direct mail,
newspaper publication, and other traditional publication avenues
cannot often be the best notice practicable with the ubiquity of
156
social media and text messaging, not to mention email and
157
general internet use, in the United States. This is especially true
given the problems that were associated with those traditional
158
communications means before the rise of the internet.
If potential class members are likely to include many people in
demographic groups that use social media or text messaging at
159
especially high rates,
those methods of communication are
as publication on the websites of certain, in some cases deck-focused, magazines,
and in print editions of USA Today and the Wall Street Journal, but not detailing why
each component was necessary).
156. See supra Sections III.B.2–.3.
157. See supra Section III.B.1.
158. See supra Section III.A.
159. See Perrin, supra note 131 (summarizing trends in social media use
between demographic groups).
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especially likely to constitute the best notice under the
circumstances. Identifying these demographic differences between
methods of communication recognizes that physical mail, and
other traditional notice means, may be the best practicable under
the circumstances for classes including, among others, many
160
elderly people and rural residents.
Creative use of social media offers similar opportunities; while
not every class will lend itself to an easily identified, already
established social media presence that can be used like Phiten’s
161
Facebook page, searching for pages and groups on Facebook—
162
both official and unofficial —and for groups on LinkedIn, could
reveal avenues to disseminate notice. While there have been some
163
instances of using text messaging, courts also miss opportunities
to put this technology to use to easily reach many likely class
164
165
members. The cases using new technologies indicate at best
inconsistency between courts and judges about what is required
under Rule 23(c)(2)(B). At worst, these cases indicate a lack of
attention to what notice would be best, instead relying on tradition
and possibly failing to fulfill the imperative in Rule 23(c)(2)(B).
What is missing from many court orders and appellate
decisions approving class action notice plans is an explicit finding
that physical mail and publication are better than other available
166
notice means. While the subject matter of a suit may have no
specific link to the internet or a particular communication
technology—the kind of detail that seems to prompt courts to use
167
newer communication technologies for notice —the suit most

160. See Purcell, supra note 112.
161. See Kelly v. Phiten USA, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 564 (S.D. Iowa 2011); supra notes
140–41 and accompanying text.
162. See Eric Eldon, Facebook Creates New Kind of “Unofficial” Community Pages,
ADWEEK BLOG NETWORK (Apr. 1, 2010, 7:53 PM), http://www.adweek.com
/socialtimes/facebooks-creates-new-kind-of-unofficial-community-pages/237934
(describing different types of Pages on Facebook).
163. See supra Section III.B.3.
164. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (citing cases where class
members’ phone numbers were known and text messaging may have been
possible for notice).
165. See supra Section III.B.
166. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (reviewing cases that do not
explicitly analyze and draw conclusions about why the notice means used were
better than others, and therefore the best).
167. See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
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often has no specific link to mail, newspapers, television, or radio,
168
either.
B.

Courts Do Not Adequately Assess Notice Plans Under Rule 23(c)(2)(B)

Considering the low use for class action notice of some of the
most popular communications platforms in the United States, it
seems that courts do not adequately assess notice plans under Rule
23(c)(2)(B). Instead, the courts rely on incomplete information
and/or an incomplete understanding of the information they have
and how it shows, or does not show, that the methods chosen or
proposed are the best practicable under the circumstances.
1.

Meaningful Measurements of Best Notice Are Lacking

One reason courts may fail to direct the best notice practicable
is that they may not look to meaningful measures of whether or not
a particular notice method is effective. Courts take note of how
many “impressions” online advertisements or a suit’s dedicated
169
website received, but the number of people seeing a website does
not necessarily correlate to the right people—members of the
class—seeing the site. This echoes concerns that publication in
widely circulated newspapers is meaningless if the individuals who
170
should receive notice are not likely to read that paper.
Measurements of impressions would likely be more
meaningful if the notice was published in targeted places that
made sense in the context, or, to recall Rule 23(c)(2)(B)’s
direction, the circumstances, of the suit. If a Facebook
advertisement, for example, is displayed specifically on the pages of
interest groups or other things related to the suit, or on the pages
of users who have indicated an interest in something related to the
171
suit or who list relevant geographic areas as where they live, a
168. See supra Section III.A (discussing cases on a variety of subject matter,
none of which specifically center on mail, newspapers, television, or radio).
169. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (citing cases where courts
pointed to large numbers of websites used or impressions of suit-specific websites,
without discussing whether those numbers were meaningful in the specific
circumstances of the case).
170. See Ginsberg, supra note 96, at 755–58.
171. Such use of Facebook recalls cases where notice has been accomplished
through more targeted media than general interest newspapers and websites; in
cases where a unifying trait or interest of the class is known, courts direct notice in
media targeted to persons with that trait or interest. See, e.g., In re Dairy Farmers of
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smaller number of impressions of that advertisement could be
more valuable than a larger number of impressions generated by
172
Use of the internet and mobile devices
an un-targeted ad.
generates large amounts of data that could be exploited for notice
and allow information about class actions to reach the right
173
people.
2.

Courts Must More Actively Police Notice Instead of Leaving the
Adequacy of Notice Up to Class Counsel

Another source of possible problems with notice is the
question of who polices whether notice complies with Rule
23(c)(2)(B) and due process rights. Courts are responsible for this
174
under the rule. However, when the class, or perhaps more
precisely, the class’ attorneys, proposes a notice scheme, judges
may only have the information provided by the class and its
attorneys. While judges should be able to trust class counsel to put
Am., Inc. Cheese Antitrust Litig., No. 09-CV-03690, 2014 WL 1017515, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 17, 2014) (directing notice via print publications or the publications’
websites, specifically: Cheese Market News, Dairy Foods, the Cheese Reporter, and Hoard’s
Dairyman). While classes of unascertainable members may still present significant
difficulty where there is little that unites class members beyond the event that
makes them class members, the way entities use tools, such as social media, can
provide clues as to how notice could be more effective. One possible strategy is to
mirror a company’s advertising in the notice scheme; if a company buys Facebook
ads that will be displayed on the accounts of users of certain genders, ages,
occupations, or other characteristics, the parties could purchase ads using the
same criteria.
172. It is possible that such targeted advertising is used in online notice
publication. However, if that is the case, it may not be apparent from a court
order. A court order stating that “[o]nline advertisements appeared on AOL,
Facebook, Yahoo!, Google, and other sites” does not sufficiently describe what
notice in that case truly entailed, so it is difficult to evaluate the adequacy of the
court’s treatment of notice, and thus the adequacy of that litigation’s compliance
with due process. In re Imprelis Herbicide Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab.
Litig., 296 F.R.D. 351, 363 & n.6 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
173. Social media sites and others generate “big data,” which has enormous
potential value to advertisers and thus parallel potential for class notice. Cf. Lisa
Arthur, What Is Big Data?, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2013, 8:17 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/lisaarthur/2013/08/15/what-is-big-data/ (defining
“big data” as “a collection of data from traditional and digital sources . . . that
represents a source for ongoing discovery and analysis”). A more thorough
discussion of big data and its potential for class notice is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
174. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
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the interests—and financial recovery—of the class first, class
counsel can be in danger of furthering their own interests when it
comes to notice, since the payments flowing to class counsel are
usually dependent on the amount of the judgment or settlement,
175
not the success rate of class notice or recovery. There may be
additional information from an opposing party, if that party sees
elements of the scheme as damaging to its interests, but parties
adverse to the class are not likely to be a reliable source to police
poor and inadequate notice, since fewer potential class members
receiving notice could be to the advantage of parties adverse to the
176
class. A court, perhaps not having the resources nor the expertise
177
to independently evaluate the sufficiency of a notice scheme,
likely relies heavily on the proposals of the parties and the parties’
178
hired experts without independently considering what notice
would constitute the “best practicable under the circumstances.”
175. See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., supra note 57, at 77–99 (describing common
arrangements for attorneys’ fees and the potential for class counsel to collude with
opposing counsel and otherwise act against the interests of the class); REDISH,
supra note 37, at 211 (describing the lack of adverseness among parties in
settlement class actions and its potential to harm absent class members).
176. Fewer class members receiving notice could mean less for class action
defendants to pay out, depending on the payment structure of the settlement or
judgment. An adverse party might have an incentive to object to the notice plan if
the plan was so inadequate that it seemed very likely to be an issue on appeal and
result in additional expenses due to appeals, additional litigation, and/or
settlement negotiations.
177. The use, or lack of use, of technology in class action notice is one
criticism among many regarding the justice system’s adoption of newer
technology. “While the law has lagged behind technological developments in the
past, the Internet seems to present challenges of an entirely different order.”
Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1279
(2002). If the Supreme Court can be described as not having “really gotten to
email,” it is not surprising that the judicial system is not a leader in understanding
and using technology. See Elena Kagan: Supreme Court Hasn’t “Gotten To” Email, CBS
NEWS (Aug. 21, 2013, 12:07 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/elena-kagan
-supreme-court-hasnt-gotten-to-email (internal quotation marks omitted).
178. There is now an industry of private companies that are hired by attorneys
to provide class action notice; “[a]s repeat players and repositories of knowledge,
these notice companies have professionalized the provision of notice and, in so
doing, have removed from the legal arena many of the operational questions. . . .”
WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 8:27, Westlaw (database
updated Dec. 2015); see Hilsee et al., supra note 89, at 1372 (noting use of experts
on notice as well as the potential utility of experts on communication and
marketing); see also, e.g., In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in Gulf of
Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 902 (E.D. La. 2012) (appointing
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Courts must, however, be more active in policing whether the
notice was or will be the best practicable, whether by independently
considering and researching notice options or by requiring
detailed justifications from the parties for why the notice meets
Rule 23(c)(2)(B)’s standard and should be considered sufficient in
light of absent parties’ due process rights. It is the role of the courts
to be the ultimate enforcer of compliance with procedural rules
179
and protector of constitutional rights.
While the hesitance of courts to rely more heavily on newer
technologies for class action notice could be seen as a desire to use
all means available and thus a tactic to protect class members, such
a conclusion ignores the fact that courts frequently still confine
notice to only a few tools or avenues, and when they do so, those
180
avenues are the more traditional ones.
V. CONCLUSION
The plain language of Rule 23(c)(2)(B), as well as its history
and close connection with constitutional due process rights,
requires that courts use newer technologies in some, perhaps even
181
most, cases. In all cases, notice must be based on circumstances of
182
the case, per the language of the rule. Given the problems with
traditional means in terms of reaching potential class members,
183
and the benefits of
both ascertainable and unascertainable,
184
newer means,
courts must treat newer means as equally
“practicable” as traditional means, and require the most
185
appropriate, or best, means in each case.
Hilsoft Notifications as Class Notice Administrator). However, even with the
availability of such services, notice programs may not be as robust as they could be:
“[l]eading notice experts have adopted the reach model for ensuring that notice
programs reach substantial percentages of their class members based on
documented audience statistics, but many notice programs still proceed without
such data and can result in disaster.” Hilsee et al., supra note 89, at 1373.
179. See Shannon R. Wheatman & Terri R. LeClercq, Majority of Class Action
Publication Notices Fail to Satisfy Rule 23 Requirements, 30 REV. LITIG. 53, 69 (2010)
(calling on judges to be “standard-bearer[s] and stringently enforce Rule 23’s
requirements”).
180. See supra Section III.A.
181. See supra Section IV.A.
182. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B); supra Section IV.A.
183. See supra Section III.A.
184. See supra Section III.B.
185. See supra Section IV.A.
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The precedents set by cases using newer technologies mean
that parties in certain types of cases—those that have a direct link
to
communications
technologies—should
expect
newer
186
technologies to be part of a notice scheme. It should be universal
that a case involving a transaction or activity that collects or uses
contact information like emails, phone numbers, and online
187
accounts will use that information for notice.
Use of newer communications technologies, however, may
make sense in cases that have no specific connection to the
collection of personal information, since parties may have such
188
information. Parties in all cases, especially classes of plaintiffs,
should evaluate what notice really makes sense, and try to convince
the court by linking the notice scheme directly to the language of
189
Rule 23(c)(2)(B) and due process concerns. Similarly, courts
must carefully evaluate the parties’ proposals and base their
190
decisions on the language and purpose of Rule 23(c)(2)(B).
While social media and text messaging are the newer
technologies of the moment that should be used more regularly
and more wisely in class action notice, there will always be new
communications technologies. Fortunately, the language of Rule
23(c)(2)(B) is extremely flexible. The courts and parties in class
action suits must always be vigilant that notice means are based on
the rule, not on tradition or convenience. Currently, this vigilance
is lacking to the detriment of class members and their
constitutional due process rights.

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

See supra notes 145–48 and accompanying text.
See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Section IV.B.2.

